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In the summer of 1943, two literary scholars were working on Keats’s “Ode on a Grecian Urn.” Kenneth Burke’s “Symbolic Action in a Poem by Keats” appeared first, in the autumn edition of Accent; 
Cleanth Brooks published his “History without Footnotes: An Account 
of Keats’ Urn” just a few months later in the Sewanee Review. Obviously 
embarrassed by the peculiar concurrence, Brooks added a note to his 
essay, in which he admits having come upon Burke’s some months after 
having completed his own. Yet despite the many similarities between 
both, Brooks says, he had resisted the urge to make alterations. Rather, 
he writes, “I am happy to find that two critics with methods and purposes 
so different should agree so thoroughly as we do on the poem. I am 
pleased, for my part, therefore, to acknowledge the amount of duplica-
tion which exists between the two essays, counting it as rather important 
corroboration of a view of the poem which will probably seem to some 
critics overingenious” (89).1 Coming across a footnote that disrupts 
the confident tone and wholeness of execution that usually character-
ize Brooks’s writing is a notable occasion in itself, but its appearance 
in an essay whose very title condemns the practice of adding them is 
striking to the point of bewilderment. Yet despite the large amount of 
scholarly response Brooks’s essay has received, the reference has been 
largely neglected. Reprinted as “Keats’s Sylvan Historian: History without 
Footnotes,” the essay became widely anthologized as the key to Brooks’s 
brilliant classic The Well Wrought Urn; Burke’s reading of the ode, on the 
other hand, went the way of the footnote, sliding almost unobtrusively 
from the margins of the page to the edges of history.2
To a considerable extent, Brooks himself can be held responsible for 
the apparent ease with which we have omitted part of his essay from 
our comments. If historians needs footnotes as forensic evidence that 
their accounts are supported by sufficient amounts of study devoted to 
incontestable sources, Brooks’s essay upholds that literary criticism moves 
on different—and ultimately more truthful—grounds of legitimacy. Thus 
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stripped of their authoritative weight, footnotes degenerate into gather-
ing places for critical debris, short references or digressions that do not 
permeate the main body of the text. In its staunch depreciation of the 
historical and philological devices that claim to summon the material 
and referential dimensions of the text, “History without Footnotes” has 
persuaded generations of critics that literature can be engaged without 
having to take recourse to such secondary levels of discourse. However, 
I will argue, the imposing presence of its ahistorical hermeneutic and 
its enmity towards the footnote as a legitimate device for the literary 
critic have severely hampered our understanding of a vital part of the 
essay’s critical politics. As Antony Grafton points out, besides their 
more obvious role as mediators between the historian’s account and the 
evidence that supports it, footnotes often serve as a way of professing 
one’s allegiance to a particular guild of scholars rather than another. 
Every historiographic act entails a battle of inclusion and omission that 
is waged—more vehemently still than in the main textual body—at the 
edges of the page, where the space (or absence thereof) devoted to other 
scholars or sources signals one’s accordance to a given set of intellectual 
or methodological principles rather than another.3 
As I will demonstrate, Brooks’s footnote about “Symbolic Action in an 
Essay by Keats” should be read as such a rhetorically laden reference, 
one through which the distinctive line of formalist criticism Burke devel-
ops is both appropriated and contained. I argue that the controversial 
line of aesthetic historicism that Brooks sought to develop through his 
reading of Keats’s ode forced him to seek Burke’s allegiance, but that, 
at the same time, the definite historist tendencies of Burke’s reading 
required it to be quarantined in the purgatory of the footnote rather 
than the main text.4 The comparative method of reading I employ to map 
the force lines underlying Brooks’s rhetoric is grafted loosely on what 
Steven Mailloux calls “rhetorical hermeneutics,” which combines close 
reading of an act of textual interpretation with a rhetorical analysis of 
the “cultural conversation” in which this act participates.5 This approach 
seems warranted by the footnote itself, as the most striking question it 
begs is why critics “with methods and purposes so different” would find 
themselves working on the exact same poem at the same time. Chance 
occurrences are, of course, bound to take place in a field where a sub-
stantial group of people is working on a fairly limited canon of poems, 
but the coincidence of vision Brooks notes between both essays, as well 
as the somewhat mysterious prediction that they might be received by 
“some critics” as “overingenious” suggest factors beyond mere chance. 
Rather, Brooks’s appropriation of Burke was part of a larger debate on 
the relation between literature, history, and scholarship—a debate that 
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acquires new interest and relevance as today’s scholars are once again 
assessing the value and limits of historical thinking in accounting for 
the distinctive features of poetry and poetic language.
Brooks’s thrust at the apparatus of the traditional literary scholar in 
“History without Footnotes” was part of a discussion on the relation 
between literary studies and history that moved to the center of critical 
debate in a lecture by Allen Tate, delivered at Princeton University in 
1940 and published in that year’s autumn edition of American Scholar 
as “Miss Emily and the Bibliographer.” In his speech, Tate accuses the 
bibliographer (a hypernym for the philological and historicist approaches 
of the nineteenth-century type) of being even more delusional than the 
protagonist of William Faulkner’s A Rose for Emily, a deranged spinster 
who continued to sleep with the body of the lover she poisoned to 
prevent him from leaving. Both Emily and the scholar, Tate sneers, can-
not bear to face their object of desire as a living, breathing entity; yet 
whereas mad Emily’s morbid longing draws her back to her dead beau 
every night, the scholar moves away from the text as a literary entity. 
Scrutinizing its material incarnations in order to uncover its biographi-
cal or sociohistorical origins, the bibliographer dissolves the text into 
an assemblage of historical sources which are held to offer access to the 
past. His eyes crusted with archival dust, the literary historian “cannot 
discern the objectivity of the forms of literature, he can only apply to 
literature certain abstractions which he derives, two stages removed, 
from the natural sciences; that is to say he gets these abstractions from 
the historians who get them from the scientists.”6 
Steeped in a line of neo-Kantian aesthetics that considered art and 
science to be epistemologically distinct fields of knowledge,7 Tate was 
highly suspicious of the bibliographer’s positivist pretensions, which he 
considered symptomatic of the growing influence of scientism in the 
humanities in general. History, Tate claims emphatically, is idiomatic, 
brought into being through the imaginative labour of selecting and ar-
ranging historical particulars into narrative sequences. The historical 
method, however, denies this primary dialectic at the basis of historical 
experience by interjecting a set of autotelic procedural models between 
the historian and his materials. While these supposedly guarantee the 
objectivity of the account, in reality they create an ontological barrier 
between the historian (subject) and the past he studies (object). Dis-
sociated from lived, concrete experience, historiography becomes an 
abstract and aimless exercise of the intellect that is indifferent to the 
values of a work of art.8 The domesticated Rankean paradigm Tate finds 
dominating the fields of history and philology imposes a generalizing 
and conceptual epistemological framework that is wholly alien to the 
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subjectivist, 9 intuitive knowledge the literary text embodies; these procru-
stean tendencies of “method,” he contends, must be overcome through 
the “Historical Imagination,” which relies on affective understanding, 
stressing the narrative character of historiography and restoring man to 
the position of a conscious agent exercising a process of selection and 
evaluation.10 Through the use of the Historical Imagination, the histo-
rian’s vantage point in the present merges with the past, a process that 
results in an organic reappropriation of the knowledge contained in it:
We must judge the past and keep it alive by being alive ourselves; and that is 
to say that we must judge the past not with a method or abstract hierarchy but 
with the present, or with as much of the present as our poets have succeeded 
in elevating to the objectivity of form. For it is through the formed, objective 
experience of our own time that we must approach the past; and then by means 
of critical mastery of our own experience we may test the presence and the value 
of form in works of the past. (MEB 459) 
T. S. Eliot’s ideas on the relation between writer and canon clearly reso-
nate throughout this passage: like Eliot’s “Tradition,” Tate’s Historical 
Imagination manifests itself as a deep-felt, continuous, and synchronic 
presence that crystallizes in the concrete linguistic form of the poem and 
acts as a moral and aesthetic guide for literary judgment. Shifting the 
object of literary studies from the poem’s individual historical content 
to its transhistorical form, Tate suspends the chronology of genres and 
works that served as the backbone of pretwentieth century historicist 
criticism and philology. 
The uproar in academic circles that ensued as a result of Tate’s bold 
speech prompted a group of critics associated with the “New Criticism” 
(John Crowe Ransom would coin the term about a year later) to publish 
Literature and the Professors in order to define a common stance on the 
relation between history and literature.11 Among the contributors to the 
symposium was Cleanth Brooks, whose “Literary History vs. Criticism” 
locates the opposition between historicist-scholarly and formalist-critical 
approaches primarily on the level of poetic language. Positivist histori-
cism, favouring content over form, considers the distorted referentiality 
of literary texts to be problematic with regard to criteria of empirical 
verifiability. Those aspects that grant the text its specifically literary char-
acter are habitually brushed aside; the historian’s scientist bias results in 
a quantitative approach that is unable to recognize the inner structure 
of poetry and drama as being qualitatively different from that of refer-
ential language. Unlike Tate, Brooks frames the inability of the literary 
historian to deal with the poetic medium as an epistemological—rather 
than a moral—incapacity, but like his Agrarian friend, he feels that the 
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reason for historicism’s inadequacy in the field of literature is, ultimately, 
ontological. Poetry contains a form of knowledge that belongs to a dif-
ferent order of being, one that the nomothetic bias of the historian pre-
vents him from seeing. The wealth of contextual information, statistical 
data or biographical conjectures that the historian routinely summons 
may create what Roland Barthes has called l’effet de reel; in fact they are 
merely so many spells meant to ward off the realization of this failure.
This brief rhetorical history of the early New Criticism’s antihistoricist 
rhetoric outlines the basis of Brooks’s antipathy towards the scholar’s 
mechanics, and explains why he would single out the footnote as the 
symbol par excellence of historicist scholarship. Shored against the ruins 
of a failing method, the footnote embodies both the historian’s pen-
chant for piling up trivia, as well as the cumbersome and often hermetic 
apparatus through which this information is elevated to the status of 
meaning. To Brooks, the footnote is not the index of critical discipline, 
but the hallmark of historicist pedantry. Furthermore, Tate’s polemic 
complicates the received notion that the New Criticism advocated an 
absolute separation between the text and the extraliterary world.12 The 
Agrarian intervention in the debate on the relation between poetry and 
its historical matrix is inspired, as Douglas Mao phrases it, “not by some 
axiomatic desire to ‘protect a quasi-religious, ontological sanctuary from 
all secularizing discourses that would situate literature in history’. . . 
but rather by anxieties provoked by history itself, where history seems 
a tale of the ever-expanding reach of science.”13 This anxiety did not 
result in an irrational flight from history but, on the contrary, gener-
ated an intense intellectual effort to redraw the boundaries of its study. 
“History without Footnotes” is best understood as an attempt toward a 
hermeneutic that would do justice to the qualitative difference of the 
historical knowledge poetry contains. 
If my short sketch of the background against which Burke and Brooks 
published their essays does not readily facilitate our understanding of the 
motives behind the curious footnote that is the focus of this essay, neither 
does it clarify why both essays would take Keats’s “Ode on a Grecian 
Urn” for their subject. Both questions are, however, closely related to the 
critical program embedded in Tate’s spatial reconceptualization of the 
bibliographer’s chronologic approach. The ultimate end of the Histori-
cal Imagination was to provide a litmus test to determine the aesthetic 
worth of different literary species. Romantic poetry did not fare well in 
this evaluative undertaking, which Tate conceived primarily as a search 
for aesthetic opposition against the moral and cultural deprivation of 
modern technocratic society. Relying on individual emotion, the poet 
fails to imbue his poetry with what Tate calls the “creative spirit”: the 
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integration of the personal, cultural and aesthetic in the living historical 
imagination. The weakness of Romanticism, he writes,
is that it gave us a poetry of “poetical” (or poetized) objects, pre-digested per-
ceptions; and in case there should be any misunderstanding about the poetical 
nature of these objects, we also got “truths” attached to them—truths that in 
modern jargon are instructions to the reader to “respond” in a certain way to 
the poetical object, which is the “stimulus.” And in the great body of nineteenth-
century lyrical poetry—whose worst ancestor was verse like Shelley’s “I arise from 
dreams of thee”—the poet’s personal emotions became the “poetic stimulus.” 
The poem as a formal object to be looked at, to be studied, to be construed . . . dissolved 
into biography and history. (Italics mine)14 
Against the backdrop of the imposing masculinity of Eliot’s Tradition 
and the moral exigency of Tate’s Historical Imagination, the Coleridgean 
doctrine of subjective imagination comes off as a pale and effeminate 
surrogate. The dissociation of sensibility that set in somewhere around 
John Milton and John Dryden had fragmented the classicist unity of 
image and idea, replacing its time-tested categories for judgment with a 
radical and eclectic individualism. The result was a dangerous historical 
relativism that celebrated the particularist character of historical events 
over their translation into formal essence. Unable to connect with the 
imaginative resources of transhistorical knowledge, the poet succumbs 
to the siren call of positivism; unlike the dynamic of tension at work in 
metaphysical poetry, where “the varieties of ambiguity and contradiction 
possible beneath the logical surface are endless,” nineteenth-century 
English verse is a poetry of communication, used “to convey ideas and 
feelings that . . . could be better conveyed by science.”15 
Stressing that meaning in poetry is continuously delayed by the 
oscillation between extension (its syntagmatic, metonymic axis, the 
development of a meaningful argument) and intension (its metaphori-
cal, paradigmatic axis that forecloses straightforward interpretation), 
Tate argued that criticism, in order to do justice to the unique dynamic 
between both in each individual poem, is necessarily and deliberately 
antimethodological. Brooks, however, argues that the resultant mark-
ers of poetry’s linguistic indeterminacy—metaphor, symbol, ambiguity, 
and paradox—can be subsumed under the master trope of irony.16 Both 
literary device and poetic effect, irony is the “obvious warping of a state-
ment by the context,” the structural principle which defers the meaning 
of individual statements to the surrounding poetic tissue, a process of 
synthesis that results in the elimination of friction and that confers a 
sense of balanced integrity on both poem and reader.17 To Tate, both 
literature’s elusive play of meaning and the essential subjective nature 
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of the historical imagination foreclose the application of fixed standards 
for interpretation; for Brooks, however, the ironic structures that operate 
in literary texts open up at least the possibility of a unified hermeneutic. 
That principle, the reading of Keats’s ode is made to demonstrate, is 
that of “dramatic propriety”: “suppose that one could show that Keats’s 
lines . . . constitute a speech, a consciously riddling paradox, put in the 
mouth of a particular character and modified by the total context of the 
poem. . . . In such case, should we not have waived the question of the 
scientific or philosophic truth of the lines in favour of the application of 
a principle curiously like that of dramatic propriety? I suggest that this 
principle is the only one legitimately to be invoked in any case” (91). 
Although Brooks’s prediction about the “overingenious” quality “some 
critics” might attribute to his close reading of Keats is usually taken to 
address historicist scholars, it seems more likely to pertain to those fellow 
formalists for whom the attempt to formulate a general hermeneutic 
principle seemed to draw the danger of reductionism closer. It was, 
however, not so much Brooks’s methodological innovation which he 
expected to spark controversy, as the fact that he put it to use on a Ro-
mantic poem. For those who, like Tate, sided with Eliot’s contention that 
the unity of thought and feeling found in Jacobean art was only regained 
in Symbolist poetry, Brooks’s attempt to bridge “the interval between 
Donne and Yeats” when there was “a shrinkage in the range and depth 
of Western man’s experience” was a highly controversial move.18 Framing 
its message about aesthetic perfection and historic truth as a discovery 
made by a single speaker, engaging on a direct and intimate level with 
its bearer, Keats’s ode epitomizes the radical, Protestant individualism 
so despised by the classicist and Catholic-conservative criticism of Eliot. 
Although Brooks proceeds carefully when taking his distance from the 
latter’s depreciative comments on the Ode’s idealist closing stanzas,19 
“History without Footnotes” is a clear attempt to break away from the 
narrow canon promoted during the early years of the New Criticism.20 
It is tempting to attribute biographical roots to Brooks’s remarkable 
demarche: the Ode’s message of aesthetic redemption, delivered by 
the urn when the speaker is teased “out of thought” and surrenders to 
its timeless beauty, would have held an intuitive appeal to the son of 
a Methodist minister. But however personal, his efforts to recuperate 
Romantic poetry for criticism also signal the shift from the regional, 
reactionary modernism of the Agrarians to a broad pedagogical proto-
col that would become a standard in literary education. The dramatic 
method of exegesis that “History without Footnotes” proposes offered 
both immediate and practical applicability: it could be performed by 
any able reader, regardless of previous education or inauguration in 
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instrumental fineries of philology, and did not require the availability 
of scholarly libraries and manuscripts. At the same time, it transformed 
Tate’s Historical Imagination into a seemingly open and pluralist method, 
while its Protestant ideological overtones (a firm belief in the power of 
the individual, emphasis on close textual scrutiny that yields aesthetic 
and historical knowledge as a form of grace) guaranteed its successful 
absorption into the curriculum of Ivy league universities. If literary studies 
habitually looked across the Atlantic for guidance (whether to Germany 
for examples of historical scholarship or to Britain for critical axioms), 
“History without Footnotes” offers a confident, pragmatic, and thoroughly 
Americanized criticism that would quickly rise to prominence as the G.I. 
Bill flooded colleges with young men who lacked previous education 
in the arts. Still, in 1943, Brooks eagerly welcomed all those who would 
corroborate his dramatic methodology—controversial not just for its 
deliberate vulgarization of poetry to include any linguistic entity with 
irony as an organizing principle, but also because it downplays the agon 
between science and poetry that is vital to Tate’s Historical Imagination 
in favor of a more unified literary hermeneutic and a more confident 
conception of literature’s power (as historian). The near simultaneous 
publication of Burke’s essay on Keats, then, must indeed have been a 
bracing occasion—especially since Burke announces his own “drama-
tistic” reading to focus on the ode’s emblematic but contested closing 
statement that “Beauty is truth, truth beauty,— that is all / Ye know on 
earth, and all ye need to know.”21 Like Brooks, Burke claims that the lines 
stage an opposition between practical (scientific) and aesthetic (poetic) 
ideals, an opposition which is reflected in—and ultimately transcended 
through—the development of the poem’s imagery. 
The scope of the dramatistic methodology Burke deploys for his read-
ing of the ode, however, differs decidedly from that of Brooks. Burke 
readily uses the kind of information one would expect to appear in 
traditional biographical criticism: a significant part of “Symbolic Action 
in a Poem by Keats” is devoted to the tubercular fever that plagued the 
poet, its impact being traced in other poems (“On Seeing the Elgin 
Marbles,” “On First Looking into Chapman’s Homer”), and fragments 
of the letters to Fanny Brawne are cited as indications of its presence 
in the mind of the poet. As a general principle, Burke urges readers to 
“use whatever knowledge is available” in order to resist the intellectual 
limitations of a factional opposition between approaches where “semantic 
meaning, that may be considered as a partial aspect of poetic meaning, 
tends to become instead the opposite of poetic meaning, so that a mere 
graded series, comprising a more-than and less-than, changes instead 
to a blunt battle between poetry and anti-poetry, ‘Poetry vs. Science’” 
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(451).22 In order to overcome the dualism between scholarly and critical 
approaches, Burke developed a conceptual apparatus that would en-
able a more inclusive analysis of the poetic substance they share, which 
he divides into three levels: Dream (the unconscious or subconscious 
factors in a poem, both personal, cultural, and archetypal), Prayer (the 
rhetorical mechanics deployed to communicate a poem to the reader 
and induce a certain response), and Chart (the “sizing-up” of a histori-
cal situation) (PLF 5–6).
Against his formalist contemporaries, Burke ties poetry to the real, 
acknowledging that “whatever ‘free play’ there may be in aesthetic 
enterprise, it is held down by the gravitational pull of historical neces-
sities: the poetic forms are symbolic structures designed to equip us 
for confronting given historical or personal situations.”23 Deploying a 
Freudian terminology of displacement and condensation on the level of 
Dream, however, his argument moves against the naïve verbal realism of 
positivist historicism, as well as causalist theories of behaviorist science 
and Marxist theories of economic determination. The poetic medium 
unites different degrees of referentiality through a series of fluid connec-
tions: the “frozen kiss” of the “Bold Lover” that is “all breathing human 
passion far above,” for instance, can betray an unconscious equation of 
sexuality and bodily decay that is, in turn, symptomatic of a larger social 
unconscious: the Romantic identification between sexuality and the 
death drive. On the level of Prayer, however, it takes part in the binary 
oppositions (motion–stillness, death–life, sound–silence, etc.) that coax 
the reader into accepting the claim that “beauty is truth, truth beauty,” 
while on the level of Chart the image connects with the respiratory dif-
ficulties related to Keats’s tubercular fever, as well as reaching out to the 
cultural fabric by accommodating the aesthetics of nineteenth-century 
Graecophilia. The poem, then, offers highly divergent ways of entry 
for the aspiring critic, including biographical, psychoanalytical, and 
especially historical, none of which can be excluded in advance from 
the domain of critical scrutiny. 
Burke stresses this point repeatedly throughout “Symbolic Action 
in a Poem by Keats,” apparently making the essay an unlikely support 
for the ascholarly, intrinsic method that Brooks advocates. It would 
be misguided, however, to claim that every corner of Burke’s triad is 
allotted equal critical weight. The rhetorical dynamics of the poem, 
the level of Prayer, takes precedence over its Dreams and Charts. If no 
contextual information is available, Burke says, the poem can only be 
looked upon as “a series of internal transformations to be studied in 
their development from a certain point, and without reference to any 
motives outside [the text]” (450). However, intrinsic analysis is not just 
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a makeshift strategy used in the absence of the sort of information that 
the bibliographer would claim for his object of study, and abandoned 
as soon as more becomes available. As Greig Henderson suggests, Burke 
gradually develops the conviction that language, the realm of the sym-
bolic, inevitable mediates all human interaction with the real.24 Indeed, 
“Symbolic Action in a Poem by Keats” can be read to proclaim this belief 
in the ontological priority of the symbolic: “[A] poem is an act,” Burke 
announces at the beginning of the essay, “the symbolic act of the poet 
who made it—an act of such a nature that, in surviving as a structure 
or object, it enables us as readers to re-enact it” (447). Faced with the 
opposition between science and art at the particular historical instance 
which he inhabited, Keats responded by proclaiming that art is the be-
all and end-all of human knowledge. What makes the ode so effective, 
however, is not just the imaginative power of this idea, but the fact that 
the poem, as a symbolic artefact that turns over against its nonsymbolic 
origins, unites both subject matter and procedure. Its symbolicity is 
what enables the ode to address us beyond the confines of its age, yet 
this ability for historical survival also closes it off from straightforward 
historicist recuperation. 
Stressing this primacy of Prayer in Burke’s triad would have enabled 
Brooks to minimize the differences between his dramatic reading and 
Burke’s. However, I would argue that, rather than downplaying the dimen-
sions of Dream and Chart in Burke’s reading, the reconceptualization of 
Tate’s Historical Imagination that Brooks performs in “History without 
Footnotes” is aimed at effacing their disruptive potential altogether. This 
critical move is best exemplified by Brooks’s comments on the image 
of the “little town” that is summoned in the fourth stanza of the ode, 
which is apparently not depicted on the urn itself, but merely suggested 
by the people coming to the sacrifice. Yet despite its being beyond 
sensual apprehension, the poet is able to infer some of the essential 
qualities of the town: it is small, bucolic, and quiet, its streets having 
been emptied by a joyous procession. This knowledge, Brooks suggests, 
is not gratuitous fancy: the poet has obtained it by pursuing the logic of 
his own imagery. Even if there were an actual vase or series of antique 
freezes on which Keats modelled his poem, the imaginative trouvaille of 
the little town demonstrates that the poet can provide a truth that dif-
fers from the factual accuracy desired by positivist historicism. Harold 
Bloom, discussing the passage, has argued that “[t]he green altar and 
the little town exist not on the urn but in the past and future that are 
phenomenological implications of the poem’s existence.”25 To Brooks, 
this is what is essential to the urn’s characterization as a “sylvan historian”: 
it delivers an imaginative truth that supersedes the historian’s accounts 
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of the contingent: “Mere accumulations of facts . . . are meaningless. 
The sylvan historian does better than that: it takes a few details and so 
orders them that we have not only beauty, but insight into essential truth. 
Its ‘history,’ in short, is a history without footnotes. It has the validity of 
myth—not myth as a pretty but irrelevant make-belief, an idle fancy, but 
myth as a valid perception into reality” (100). Brooks’s equation between 
literary form and “true” history on the one hand and history and myth 
on the other, can be compared to the notion of “figural causation” that 
Erich Auerbach develops in Mimesis. As a mode of historicism, Hayden 
White argues, figural causation differs from ancient teleological notions 
of history as well as modern, mechanistic historicism in the kind of rela-
tion it supposes between historical events. What Auerbach suggests is 
“a history conceived as a sequence of figure–fulfilment relationships” 
in which “[t]he later events are not ‘caused’ by earlier ones, certainly 
not ‘determined’ by them. Nor are the later events predictable on any 
grounds of teleology as realizations of earlier potentialities. They are 
related in the way that a rhetorical figure, such as a pun or metaphor, 
appearing in an early passage of a text, might be related to another 
figure, such as a catachresis or irony, appearing in a later passage.”26 As 
a series of tropological connections, history as both process and practice 
folds into the literary: the claims that positivist historians make with re-
gard to the representation of the past are merely one species of literary 
rhetoric taking part in the metahistory of mimetic desire that underlies 
Auerbach’s work. In quite similar fashion, the structures of irony that 
Brooks finds operating on the level of the image find their fulfilment in 
the poem as an organic whole, which in turn appears as a synecdoche 
of the broader horizon of the transcendental literary “Imagination” that 
is the foundation for all nondiscursive historical knowledge.
Both Auerbach and Brooks espouse a formalist conception of history, 
but whereas the concept of figural causation enables Auerbach to relate 
literature and context by seeing the text as a “figuration” of its historical 
milieu, in Brooks’s criticism, the synecdochic relations between irony, 
history, and imagination merge into an opaque, organic whole, a “silent 
form” that is impervious to attempts at chronological separation or 
paraphrase. Auerbach’s indexical formalism enables critics to access the 
realm of the historically real; Brooks’s aesthetic alternative allows only 
a vision of poetic universals.27 If Tate’s critique of literary historicism 
was rooted in a Manichean antithesis between poetic value and scien-
tific truth, Brooks’s aesthetic historicism no longer projects science as 
an outside: by “teas[ing] us out of thought,” the poem-as-myth offers a 
knowledge that supersedes all other, fragmentary discourses that inform 
it. To be sure, Brooks acknowledges that poetry has sociohistorical or 
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psychobiographical origins, nor does he deny that the bibliographer 
might contribute to our understanding: in its nature as myth, however, 
poetry simply ceases to be a medium through which these dimensions 
can be mediated or engaged. If we recall the ongoing dualism in Brooks’s 
own practice as a student of literature, this way of solving the problem 
of the extrinsic is hardly surprising. If contingent history yields to po-
etic myth, advocating a formalist, acontextual strand of criticism while 
devoting a significant part of one’s career to footnote-laden philological 
labour of editing the letters of the eighteenth-century bishop and liter-
ary antiquarian Thomas Percy ceases to be a schizophrenic position: 
the sublime discourse of poetry already “contains” both within itself.28 
Provided that the structural hierarchy in which intrinsic analysis precedes 
extrinsic speculation is preserved, they may each yield their own kind 
of hermeneutic satisfactions.29 
Each poem, then, is like the “peaceful citadel” in the ode, a paradox 
which “involves a clash between the ideas of war and peace and resolves 
it in the sense of stability and independence without imperialistic ambi-
tion—the sense of stable repose” (97). The corresponding attitude is 
one of disinterested contemplation: Brooks conjures the reader not to 
be overwhelmed by the initial, fragmentary strangeness of the poetic 
material, but to look for imaginative unity. Like Wallace Stevens’s voices 
at Key West, dramatic readings confer the idea of order and subdue the 
shiver of history a reader may experience when confronted with the his-
toricity of the poem. Personal interests or desires, then, are merely the 
hysteria of a Southern spinster, an affective fallacy committed silently at 
the edge of the community of righteous readers; mimicking the formal 
perfection of their object of study on both the levels of form and con-
tent, Brooks’s essays offer themselves to the reader as just such peaceful 
citadels of knowledge. The footnote, the index of a differential whose 
visually disjunctive presence on the page bears witness to the interaction 
of a historical reader with the text and summons the possibility of other, 
extrapoetical levels of textuality, opposes this totalizing hermeneutic. 
However, by claiming for poetry a transcendent, mythic totality that in-
cludes every difference within itself, “History without Footnotes” manages 
to clear a space where the corrosive potential of the scholarly apparatus 
can be absorbed. Jerome McGann has remarked that Brooks’s footnotes 
“are all decidedly unscholastic: leisurely, self-referential, or digressive 
discussions or brief cross-references.”30 As I have tried to demonstrate, 
however, when pressured by deliberately historicizing, some of these 
casual gestures can be revealed to mask a definite rhetorical content in 
the form of a careful strategy of recuperation and containment. The 
seemingly cordial reference to Burke enlists his reading of the ode as an 
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ally against potentially averse reactions on the part of critics like Tate, 
while at the same time Burke is displaced to a medium whose contribu-
tion to the overall meaning of the text is—Brooks makes abundantly 
clear—at best secondary. 
But why would Brooks choose this roundabout way to acknowledge 
Burke? After all, stressing the primacy of Prayer, Burke’s dramatism does 
seem highly convergent with Brooks’s principle of dramatic propriety. 
When we insist that language—the symbolic—is the ultimate ontologi-
cal horizon of the human, the psychobiographical and cultural-historic 
dimensions of the poem cease to be forces of opposition against the 
kind of free-floating formalism that Brooks established. Burke himself 
expressed a continuous awareness of the relativistic tendencies inher-
ent in his dramatist heuristic, where the dialectic between the levels of 
Dream, Prayer, and Chart is arrested when one element is elevated above 
the others.31 Such reductionist operations signal the crystallization of 
dynamic interrelations into teleological structures of power—Brooks’s 
emphasis on the acquisition of mythical knowledge being a case in point. 
The knowledge of essentials that his dramatic reading promises to bring 
demands a complete suspension of disbelief on the part of its specta-
tor, a complete surrender of the critical faculties to the poem’s unified 
structural movement. Brooks’s drama, then, appropriates the full weight 
of classical tragedy. Ironically, what started out as a project against the 
normative truths of Enlightenment modernity and the neutral objec-
tivism of positivist science is exchanged for a similar ideal of distance. 
It is this ideal of distance that the dramatism of “Symbolic Action 
in a Poem by Keats” negates, giving it a decidedly Brechtian quality. If 
it is true that the poem’s nature as a symbolic act is what grants it the 
ability to transcend its personal and historical moment of composition, 
Burke reminds us that, as a symbolic act, the poem forces us to reply 
with an act of reading that is, like the original act of writing, historically 
determined. If writing poetry involves “the adopting of various strategies 
for the encompassing of situations” (PLF 3), our act of critical reading 
likewise entails stressing some elements over others. Poetry can give us 
knowledge about the real—both contemporary and historical—yet we 
must be aware that such knowledge is always momentaneous, specific, 
and inevitably blindsided by the limits of the perspective from which we 
engage it. Although Burke’s analyses of symbolic structures are steeped in 
the awareness that nonlinguistic access to historical reality is impossible, 
history remains as the material and temporal substratum in which every 
interpretive act is grounded. Thus, Burke’s drama does not gain the 
monolithical, tragic qualities of Brooks’s: eagerly intertextual, flaunting 
several footnotes, and using a mobile conceptual vocabulary, “Symbolic 
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Action in a Poem by Keats” embodies the comic attitude that underlies 
Burke’s dramatism, which constantly bears witness to its awareness of 
its own discursive limitations.
Perhaps, then, the footnote that served as the focus of this essay illus-
trates not just the striking differences in both method and purpose stored 
under the heading of “formalism,” but also the power of the Romantic 
lyric in shaping these different critical approaches. If Brooks sought to 
recuperate the “Ode on a Grecian Urn” for literary studies because it 
showed how the individual could transform historical particulars into 
nondiscursive and essential truth, to Burke the ode epitomizes the ever 
shifting dynamics between the demands of personal expression, con-
textual information, and imaginative demand at play within all poetry. 
Against Brooks’s classical, monolithic drama, Burke’s literary criticism 
runs along this “negative capability” (to borrow Keats’s expression) of 
the textual and the historical reflected in both content and form of the 
lyric. Insisting that every interpretation is an act that inevitably entails 
an affective—or, as Burke would say, terministic—fallacy, it is this self-
reflexive, lyrical awareness of his criticism that differentiates his formalism 
from that of his New Critical contemporaries, causing him to be buried 
in the silence of Brooks’s footnote. 
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